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INTRODUCTION
New Brunswick’s labour legislation has been seriously eroded over the last twenty 
years. Long-established legislation that has protected workers has been slowly depleted. 
This erosion has the potential to alter the future of the province. Although New Bruns­
wick’s labour legislation has long been the site of recurring struggles over the definition 
of eligible employees, specification of bargaining units and rights of collective action, 
a direct assault on trade union freedoms has been aimed at the protection of workers.
This article will examine the changes in New Brunswick’s labour laws 
since 1988 using the criteria established by Harry W. Arthurs in “What Immor­
tal Hand or Eye? Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of Labour Law”, which ques­
tions the reasons for the re-drawing of the “boundaries of protection” for workers.1
Many of the protections once found in New Brunswick’s labour legislation 
have been amended, modified or quashed. The result is that many well-established 
values and principles that previous generations considered fundamental labour and hu­
man rights have been taken away. To appreciate this erosion of protection, an exami­
nation of the development of labour law in New Brunswick and in Canada is helpful.
THE ORIGINS OF LABOUR LAW IN NEW BRUNSWICK
Unions and collective bargaining were entirely legal in Canada after 1872; how­
ever, most labour relations law prior to the 1940s was about evading the rea­
sonable expectation that workers and unions would enjoy some protection 
for union membership and collective bargaining in dealing with employers.
Provincial labour legislation began in 1900 with the adoption of the Federal 
Conciliation Act. The Act established a federal Department of Labour which was
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staffed by officers who provided conciliation of labour disputes at the request of the 
parties concerned.
At this time, Canadian workers gained workplace protection through legis­
lated structures like the 1907 Industrial Dispute Investigation Act (IDIA) which ap­
plied to mining, transportation, communication companies, and utilities. It had, how­
ever, a limited impact as it offered no more than a de facto form of union recognition 
through the conciliation process. The fundamental problem of industrial relations 
remained the gross disparity of bargaining power between employers and workers.
Following the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919, the IDIA was amended to 
provide for the appointment of a conciliation board prior to a work stoppage tak­
ing place. However, jurisdictional disputes arose and the IDIA was challenged 
in the 1925 case of Toronto Electric Power Commissioners v. Snider on the basis 
that the federal government was acting beyond its proper constitutional juris­
diction.2 The court held that the IDIA did not apply to municipal employees and 
therefore appointment of a conciliation board in a labour dispute in the provin­
cial or municipal sectors was outside the Minister’s jurisdiction. The federal ID­
IA’s assumption of competence was successfully challenged when the case pro­
ceeded to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of England which issued a 
decision that limited application of the Act to federal works and undertakings.
When amending the IDIA in the light of the constitutional decision, the 
Government of Canada made the statute applicable to industries and provincial la­
bour jurisdictions if the respective provincial legislature so determined. New 
Brunswick took up the offer in 1938. Thus, the predominance of provincial juris­
diction in labour matters and the limits of federal jurisdiction were established.
The first Annual Report from the Department of Labour indi­
cates that new legislation was introduced between 31 October 1937 and 
31 October 1938: An Act respecting Labour and Industrial Relations.
Issues of labour relations came to the national forefront in 1944, largely due 
to the Second World War. Since much of the workforce was involved in the war, sup­
ply and demand issues related to available labour became prominent and resulted in 
many work stoppages, exposing voids in labour legislation. This newfound national 
significance enabled the federal government to use its power over matters relating to 
“peace, order and good government” per ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 
to enact labour legislation that would normally have been outside of its constitutional 
jurisdiction.
It was during the war, early in 1944, that the Wartime Labour Relations
2 Toronto Electric Power Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] AC 396.
Regulations known as PC 1003 were promulgated. Among other things, PC 1003 
provided a legal framework for access to collective bargaining supervised by the 
Wartime Labour Relations Board. The regulations included a requirement for par­
ties subject to the regulations to meet and bargain in good faith similar to that estab­
lished by the Wagner Act in the United States in 1935. PC 1003 became the frame­
work for the legalization of the collective bargaining process as it is known today.
The central features of PC1003 included: the establishment of a right for 
managerial employees to form and join unions, the prohibition of employer acts de­
signed to prevent employees from organizing, the authorization of labour boards to 
certify unions and the exclusivity of representation, the requirement that employers 
bargain in good faith, prior to resorting to economic sanction, and the requirement 
that the parties participate in government-sponsored conciliation during the term of 
the collective agreement parties and that no party engage in strikes or lock-outs during 
that conciliation.
Following the repeal of the federal wartime regulations in 1948, virtu­
ally all provinces (and the federal government) adopted the United States’ Wag- 
ner-style labour relations statutes, covering all employees in the private sec­
tor. The Industrial Relations Act of today is a direct descendant of those laws 
which have been the site of recurring struggles over the definition of eligible em­
ployees, the specification of bargaining units, and the rights of collective action.
In 1948, workers in Canada received another boost to the legitimacy of their 
established rights to organize and bargain collectively. The International Labour Orga­
nization (ILO), an agency of the United Nations, spelled out the details of the right to 
freedom of association in its conventions. The Government of Canada supported the 
adoption of both key labour rights conventions, No. 87 (Freedom of Association and 
the Right to Organize) and No. 98 (The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining), 
confirming the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. It was not until the 
1960s, however, that public sector employees across the country gained the right to 
organize and collectively bargain with their employers in the federal and provincial 
jurisdictions.
Public sector bargaining legislation was introduced in New Brunswick in 
1968 under Premier Louis Robichaud with the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 
which mirrored the Federal Public Service Labour Relations Act by allowing for pub­
lic sector employees to commence organizing into unions and bargaining collectively. 
The legislation provided “boundaries of protection” for most provincial government 
employees in New Brunswick similar to those governing workers and their unions in 
the private sector.
The Industrial Relations Act and the Public Service Labour Relations
Act both afforded workers the right to withdraw their services and strike to sup­
port bargaining demands following the exhaustion of a conciliation process.
THE DECLINE OF WORKER PROTECTIONS
In his text “Collective Bargaining In Canada—Human Right or Canadian Illu­
sion”, Derek Fudge explains that almost every jurisdiction in Canada has experi­
enced a major violation of the bargaining rights of its citizens over the last twenty- 
five years.3 Collective agreements have been virtually shredded. Freely negotiated 
wages and benefits have been taken away. Employers’ proposals have been legis­
latively imposed on workers and the right to strike has been removed in complete 
disregard for the rights that have been entrenched since the 1940s. In New Bruns­
wick, both the private and the public sector have been hit by this phenomenon.
Harry W. Arthurs has outlined three possible intersecting causes of dimin­
ished worker protections in labour legislation:
The “original sin” of inept conceptualization or poor drafting of labour laws 
and/or;
A subsequent “fall from grace” occasioned by the emergence of new para­
digms at work and/or;
The deliberate re-entrenchment of boundaries under the influence of neo 
liberal policies.4
As Arthurs states, “the result is that the traditional communities of work­
ers who once aspired to or enjoyed protection no longer receive it and that new 
communities with equally as compelling claims are likely to be denied it”.5
1. The “Original Sin”: Inept Conceptualization or Poor Drafting of Labour Laws
First, it is important to examine the falling of the “boundaries of protection” in light of 
the ever-varying mandate and influence of the provincial Department of Labour. In New 
Brunswick, we have seen several changes in the autonomy, size and functions of the 
Ministry of Labour over the last 25 years. It has been argued that in Canada, as in most 
democratic countries, provincial labour departments came to be perceived as a “natural” 
or “functional” division of administrative and legislative responsibility comparable to 
departments of education, agriculture, and health.6 Additionally, as Arthurs explains:
3 Ibid.
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the creation of a Labour Department was understood to have symbolic 
significance for working people, especially in an era when they had only 
recently acquired the franchise, when collective bargaining was in its in­
fancy, when labour standards were threatened by a predatory form of 
capitalism and when “the social question”—the welfare state—still agi­
tated most economically advanced democracies. Its continued existence 
in later years conveyed to workers that “their” department would serve 
“their” needs and protect “their” interests, and that “their” minister (often 
someone with links to the union movement) would present “their” point 
of view sympathetically when important political and economic decisions 
affecting workers were taken at the senior levels of government.7
As Arthurs explains, however, provincial labour departments can no longer 
be viewed in quite the same way. “Increasing influence from the business community 
on public policy, the widespread acceptance of market solutions to social problems, 
the shift from Keynesian to supply side economics and the desire to deregulate labour 
markets are some of the practical reasons that labour departments have been recon­
figured from their own original functions redistributed, downgraded or abandoned.”8
The New Brunswick Department of Labour began in 1904 as a Bureau of La­
bour under the Department of the Provincial Secretary-Treasurer. At present, its stature 
has been diminished and the Department has been bumped to a back seat position at the 
provincial cabinet table, but its history reveals that it was once prominent in the legis­
lature. In 1910, a Commissioner of Labour was appointed. The Department of Health 
and Labour was established in 1926. In 1936, a Fair Wage Officer was appointed, in 
1937 a Fair Wage Board was created, and in 1941 a Director of Labour was appointed.
The province’s provisions evolved from the preliminary promis­
es of the 1938 Act respecting Labour and Industrial Relations (more rheto­
ric than reality) to the more substantive provisions of the 1945 Labour Re­
lations Act, which provided for recognition and certification of unions as 
bargaining agents, as implemented by the federal jurisdiction in wartime.
A separate Department of Labour was established in 1944 with an ex­
traordinarily broad jurisdiction, which included the following statutes: The Fac­
tories Act, The Stationary Engineers’Act, The Apprenticeship Act, The Labour Re­
lations Act, The Minimum Wage Act, The Industrial Standards Act, The Trades 
Examination Act, The Fair Wages and Hours o f Labour Act, The Vacation Pay 
Act, The Weekly Rest Period Act, and The Fair Employment Practices Act. De­
partmental reports were issued annually and included summaries of general condi­
tions in industry. The reports were presented by the Fair Wage Officer and then, 
in 1943, the reports were issued by the Director of Labour and by the Minister of 
Health and Labour. This evolution was in keeping with that of other jurisdictions.
7 Ibid., 375-376.
8 Ibid., 376.
From 1945 to 1952 the reports of the Department of Labour were issued 
by the Minister of Labour. The 1945 annual report mentions that the Ministry’s re­
sponsibilities were expanded to include apprenticeship training, factory inspection, 
boiler inspection, examination and classification of stationary engineers, conciliation 
and arbitration in labour disputes. It is easy to appreciate why workers in New Bruns­
wick would perceive the Department of Labour as having a “symbolic significance.” 
From 1975 to 1983, the Department was known as the Department of Labour and 
Manpower. Through this period, Canada hit the high water mark in union density.9
In 1992, the entire legislative structure dealing with work-life issues in the 
Province was corralled into a single department, the Department of Advanced Educa­
tion and Labour. Its mission statement in 1993 did not even mention the previous 
mandate of the Department of Labour:
The continued development of New Brunswick as a viable econom­
ic entity depends on its ability to establish a strong knowledge base 
within and employment opportunities for its population.
The Department of Advanced Education and Labour provides or assures 
the provision of a learning environment which advances New Brunswick 
adults along the knowledge/skill continuum, and a working environment 
which is fair, safe, productive and harmonious and permits New Bruns- 
wickers to move through learning/working cycles, so that:
♦ N ew  Brunswick adults achieve satisfactory levels o f  educational 
attainment;
♦ New  Brunswick adults achieve skills and  knowledge consistent 
with the needs o f  the labour market
♦ New  Brunswick adults achieve satisfactory labour fo rce  p a rtic i­
pation  levels;
♦ N ew  Brunswickers have satisfactory opportunities to enhance  
their em ployability through w ork experience;
♦ New  Brunswickers have satisfactory levels o f  fairness, equity, 
safety; productivity  and  harmony in their working environments;
♦ N ew  Brunswickers have satisfactory levels o f  safety in other en­
vironments.10
In 1994-95 the Department’s mission statement was expanded to include:
We create and promote opportunities for self sufficiency for New Bruns­
wickers through quality life-long learning.
9 Diane Galameau, “Unionized Workers”, Perspectives on Labour and Income, Spring 1996 (Statistics 
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We contribute to a secure, equitable, productive and inclusive environment 
in which to learn, work and live better.11
Over the years, references to the principles of the Labour Department, as an 
icon for workers in the traditional legislative context, have not been included in the 
mission statement. Instead, the language used is either corporate-sounding or indi­
vidualistic—the language of collectivism/labour/public utility is missing. “Quality 
life-long learning” sounds like a euphemism for “you’re going to need to take a corre­
spondence course at age fifty-seven so that you can learn how to work in a call centre, 
because we won’t be protecting your good manufacturing job”. Similarly, “ensuring 
New Brunswick’s competitiveness” sounds like the start gun for the race to the bot­
tom, not good public policy for workers in New Brunswick. This trend has continued 
to the present Department of Post-Secondary Education, Training and Labour mission 
statement:
We ensure the New Brunswick workforce is competitive by making 
strategic investments in people through innovative programs, servic­
es and partnerships. We also contribute to a fair, equitable, productive 
and inclusive environment in which to learn, work and live.12
As Arthurs observes, labour departments have never had exclusive control 
over crucial decisions affecting the well-being of workers.13 However, the erosion 
of the significance of the New Brunswick Department of Labour has established the 
ground work for a reduction in legislative protection for workers. There are many 
actors now establishing and exercising their influence on labour, such as autonomous 
central banks and Standard and Poores, the American financial and credit rating in­
stitution. These external organizations are expected to use their power to set inter­
est rates and their influence over credit and investment deliberately to “cool out” the 
economy to prevent wages from rising too rapidly.
The New Brunswick Minister of Finance regularly initiates reductions in 
taxation, public expenditures and public employment with the ostensible objective of 
stimulating private sector investment and creating jobs. These reductions, however, 
frequently take the form of cuts to social programs and training schemes, endangering 
security for workers and shifting the balance of power in the labour market towards 
employers. These cuts, in turn, often result in lower levels of staffing in labour expec­
torants (Occupational Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation, for example) 
and also in the Labour and Employment Board, the Employment Standards Board, and 
their associated tribunals, lowering the levels of regulatory compliance with labour 
standards.
11 New Brunswick, Department of Advanced Education and Labour, Annual Report, (Fredericton: 
Department of Advanced Education and Labour, 1994).
12 New Brunswick, Department of Post-Secondary Education, Training and Labour, Annual Report, 
(Fredericton: Department of Post-Secondary Education, Training and Labour, 2007).
13 Arthurs, supra note 1 at 377.
Arthurs further observes that Departments of Justice, whether fed­
eral or provincial, are not necessarily well suited to defend the rights of labour:
The Department of Justice is the “government’s law firm.” But while of 
course it consults “client” departments, unlike most law firms, Justice 
generally makes decisions for them rather than simply following their 
instructions. Consequently legal values and the organizational logic 
of the Justice Department, rather than the pragmatics of labour and em­
ployment policy, are likely to shape the outcome of litigation, the draft­
ing and interpretation of legislation and even the evolution of policy [in 
respect to labour]. Whether Justice lawyers can be spared from other 
tasks for the enforcement of labour legislation, what stance the govern­
ment should take when labour laws are challenged on federalism or 
Charter grounds, what degree of juridification ought to be introduced 
into adjudicative proceedings at what cost to the ability of unrepresented 
workers to participate: such questions are very likely to be resolved by 
the Department of Justice, not by the Department of Labour.14
Arthurs would likely argue that the disappearance of the former Department 
of Labour in New Brunswick within the Department of Post-Secondary Education, 
Training and Labour leaves the “new” Department without a clear mandate to pro­
tect labour. If the big concepts are designed ineptly, then real results are forestalled.
The transformation of the Department of Labour is but one of the factors that 
have removed or reduced the boundaries of protection for workers.
2. A subsequent “fall from grace” occasioned by the emergence of new paradigms 
at work.
Between 1988 and 2008, there has been a major shift in how work is per­
formed in both the public and the private sectors. Work in the natural re­
source sectors (fishing, agriculture, mining) that once sustained the New Bruns­
wick economy has given way to work in the service sector (call centres, retail).
Caught in the throes of a changing global economy, New Brunswick’s work­
force saw many well-paid, unionized jobs dissolve into jobs that, in many cases, lack 
job security, adequate employment benefits, pension and insured benefits.
For example, in 1980, less than 10 percent of the public service workforce 
in the province worked on a casual basis. In 2009, that percentage is estimated at 
upwards of 23 to 25 percent of the public service. Casual workers employed by the 
provincial government are denied basic protections. They have no job security and 
reduced employment benefits such as pensions, health care, and accumulated vacation.
14 Ibid., 378-379.
This is the reality, despite the 2007 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
B.C. Health Services.15 In the majority decision, co-authors McLachlin CJC and LeB- 
el J forcefully declared that “recognizing that workers have the right to bargain col­
lectively as part of their freedom to associate reaffirms the values of dignity, personal 
autonomy, equality and democracy.” However, today there are over eight thousand 
casual workers in the New Brunswick public service awaiting a decision from the 
Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick. A three-union coalition, composed of 
the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers and the New Brunswick Union of Public and Private Employees, challenged 
the constitutionality of provisions of the Public Service Labour Relations Act RSNB, 
c P-25 which deny casual employees all rights pursuant to that legislation, including 
the freedom to be a member of an employee organization “and to participate in the 
legal activities of an employee organization, essentially the right to negotiate the terms 
and conditions of employment.”16 The case was originally argued in July 2006 and 
reargued in September of 2007 after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in B.C. 
Health Services.
While casual workers in New Brunswick await a decision from the Court of 
Queen’s Bench, the Quebec Superior Court in October 2008 and the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in November 2008 both followed the Supreme Court of Canada June 2007 
decision in B.C. Health Services. The Ontario Court of Appeal relied heavily on B.C. 
Health Services when it rendered its decision in Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
noting the following at paragraph 52:
In summary, the combined effect o f Dunmore and B.C. Health Services 
is to recognize the s.2(d) protects the right of workers to organize and to 
engage in meaningful collective bargaining. The decisions also recognize 
that, in certain circumstances, s.2(d) may impose obligations on the govern­
ment to enact legislation to protect the rights and freedoms of vulnerable 
groups.17
In Ontario, the courts are saying that there may be a positive obligation to 
enact legislation to protect the right to organize, while in New Brunswick, unions were 
forced to turn to litigation to get an exclusion for casual employees dropped from the 
definition of “employee” in the PSLRA. In the Ontario Crown Employees Collective 
Bargaining Act, an employee is simply somebody who works for the government. This 
is the governing principle in New Brunswick’s Industrial Relations Act, which governs 
labour relations in the private sector. The unions were starting from a disadvantage 
and the government still chose to defend the constitutionality of its PSLRA scheme.
15 Health Services and Support -  Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 391,2007 SCC 27.
16 Factum of the Appellant in the appeal of New Brunswick Union o f  Public and Private Employees v. 
New Brunswick (Board o f  Management), 2007 NBQB 53, [2007] N.B.J. No. 38
17 Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 4543,2008 ONCA 760 at para 52.
In her paper, “Why Unions Matter”, Elaine Bernard argues that denying 
workers rights in the workplace adversely affects them in their roles as citizens. The 
“workplace is also a place where workers learn about the relations of power. They 
learn that they actually have few rights to participate in decisions about events of great 
consequence to their lives ... It is no surprise that citizens who spend eight or more 
hours a day obeying orders with no rights, legal or otherwise, to participate in crucial 
decisions that affect them, do not engage in robust, critical dialogue about the structure 
of our society.”18
Casual workers with the province of New Brunswick still lack 
job security or job benefits, values that extend from the right to free collec­
tive bargaining by not being offered legitimate employee status under the 
PSLRA. This is the new paradigm that Arthurs says has fallen from grace.
3. The deliberate re-entrenchment of boundaries under the influence of neo­
liberal policies.
A third factor in the erosion of labour protections in New Brunswick has been the 
lack of political will to provide legislative protection. In his text, the “New Structural 
Social Work”, Bob Mullaly described the political culture that gripped Canada in the 
mid 1980s in the following manner:
Faced with mounting deficits, governments could either raise taxes and extend 
the tax base (as some European countries did), or reduce government expen­
diture. Right-winged governments were elected in 1979 in Britain, in 1980 
in the United States, and in 1984 in Canada. All three governments voiced 
similar priorities to deal with their respective economic crises. Thatcher’s 
Conservatives stressed the values of ‘self reliance’, Reagan’s Republican 
aimed ‘to get big government’ off the backs of people and Mulroney’s Pro­
gressive Conservatives declared that ‘Canada was open for business’. These 
governments chose to reduce expenditures rather than raise taxes.19
This public policy direction, supported by draconian legislative measures, 
led to the establishment of regulatory competition among provincial governments. 
From the early 1980s, provincial governments across the country began to take away 
the rights that public sector workers had struggled to achieve, in an apparent race to 
the bottom. For instance, in New Brunswick, the Liberal Government led by Premiers 
Frank McKenna, Raymond Frenette and Camille Theriault (1987-1999), followed by 
the Progressive Conservative Government of Premier Bernard Lord (1999-2006), fell 
into the regulatory competition trap and contributed to the dismantling of workers’ 
protection legislation.
18 Elaine Bernard, “Why Unions Matter” (1996) online: Harvard University <http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/programs/lwp/1996%20Why%20Unions%20Matter.pdf>.
19 Bob Mullaly, The New Structural Social Work, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007) 5.
From 1975 to 1979, the federal government initiated nation-wide 
“wage and price control” to address high levels of inflation. The measures 
did little to control prices, but severely restricted wage growth for workers.
Following the lifting of the federal wage and price controls, public sector 
unions negotiated “catch up” collective agreements. For example, in 1980 the New 
Brunswick Nurses Union negotiated a 41 percent pay increase over two years, as a catch 
up from 1975 to 1980 when there were not any increases. The provincial government 
led by Premier Richard Hatfield soon thereafter sought the public sector unions’ agree­
ment to a voluntary wage capping of expectations based on the 6 and 5 percent model, 
which is discussed below. This voluntary wage capping was sustained until 1987.
By 1982, Canada was in the midst of another bout of raging inflation. Gov­
ernments responded with legislation that put caps on wage increases in the public 
sector. The model followed by most provincial governments was the “6 and 5” 1982 
federal legislation that limited increases to 6 percent in the first year and 5 percent 
in the second. This legislation was a sham. The clear evidence was that wages fol­
lowed inflation, not the other way around. If inflation was running at 8 percent per 
year, for example, workers pressed their unions to negotiate contracts that would 
protect their standards of living achieving pay increases of at least 8 percent.20
The effect of wage control legislation served to reduce the standard of liv­
ing for public sector employees, especially lower paid employees. Most of the leg­
islation expressed the limits in percentage of wages, not actual dollar amounts. 
This meant that lower income families were hit the hardest. The cost of food, rent 
or maintaining a car went up in actual dollars and cents, as opposed to percent­
ages of minuscule incomes. For lower paid workers, the cost of living rose much 
more rapidly as a percentage of their income than it did for higher paid workers.
In 1987, the New Brunswick Liberal Party, led by Frank McKenna, swept 
into power with an absolute majority. With all fifty-eight seats in the legislative as­
sembly, the Liberals chimed in with their own recipe for cost containment and cost re­
duction measures. Targeted were the least fortunate New Brunswickers: workers and 
those trapped in the welfare system. Soon thereafter, the legislative assault on workers 
continued with a newfound disregard for those on the lower end of the wage scale.21
In her paper “In McKenna No Trust: Labour’s Response to the Expenditure 
Management Act of 1992 in New Brunswick,” Caroline Mann determined that Pre­
mier Frank McKenna’s “stronghold” in the Legislative Assembly was not lost on him 
and he embarked on an aggressive drive toward what would be ultimately labelled
20 Fudge, supra note 3 at 29.
21 Stewart Hyson, “The Horrible Example.” Policy Options vol. 9 (1988), 25-27.
“The Path to Self-Sufficiency in New Brunswick.”22 In December 1988, the McKenna 
government passed a bill to amend the Industrial Relations Act (Bill 73) by taking 
away the right to strike from all municipal and regional police officers and replacing it 
with binding arbitration. The Industrial Relations Act was amended again in May 1989 
to enable the provincial cabinet to designate specific construction work as a “major 
project” and consolidate unionized workers into a single, new bargaining unit. In ad­
dition, picketing restricted at worksites designated as “major projects” was outlawed.
However, after a decade of voluntary wage capping, the Liberal govern­
ment found itself in difficult circumstances as the salary levels of provincial gov­
ernment employees had fallen behind the national average. In fact, New Bruns­
wick public sector workers were among the lowest paid in the ten provinces. 
In 1990, the New Brunswick Nurses Union’ negotiated a 21 percent increase 
catch-up agreement to offset wage losses incurred over the previous eight years.
The ink was barely dry on these collective agreements when the Lib­
eral government legislated four years of wage restraint. The provincial govern­
ment proclaimed the Expenditure Management Act (Bill 73) in May 1991 (EMA 
1991). The Act provided for a one-year wage freeze for all public sector employ­
ees in the fiscal year 1991-1992. The EMA 1991 was met with reluctant accep­
tance from public sector unions. Although the government had consulted with 
all public sector unions prior to one year-wage freeze taking effect, the message 
from the government was that it was a temporary wage freeze for one year only.
In April 1992, the government passed a wage “restraint” statute called the 
Expenditure Management Act II (Bill 42). Gerald Clavette, then the Minister respon­
sible for the Board of Management, explained in the Legislative Assembly that since 
the EMA 1991 had worked so well for the government, it planned on passing the EMA 
1992. This gave unions an option: they could accept a two-year wage package at 1 
percent and 2 percent inserted into their collective agreements, effectively extending 
the collective agreements and delaying any previously unpaid negotiating improve­
ments by two years, or they could negotiate for some other period of extension or 
delay in negotiated wage improvements “consistent” with the restraint measure con­
tained in the legislation.
Mann stated that “the government’s standpoint seemed to be that they were 
willing to tolerate and negotiate with the public sector but that, if necessary, collec­
tive agreements would be broken.” Allan Maher, who from 1987 to 1995 was Fi­
nance Minister in Premier McKenna’s cabinet, confirmed this. Maher said that de­
spite the tension and anger, the wage restraint legislation should go ahead and once
22 Caroline Mann, In McKenna No Trust: Labour’s Response to the Expenditure? Act o f 1992 in New 
Brunswick [unpublished, archived at University of New Brunswick]; “Premier Steps Actions Matching 
Words: Self Sufficiency Aim of McKenna Government” The Daily Gleaner (21 May 1992).
again freeze wages. According to Maher, it would be ‘the only logical solution”.23
The assault on labour’s protections continued. In April 1994, an Act to Amend 
the Industrial Relations Act (Bill 47) was passed by the Liberal government, giving 
employers the authority to request that a union conduct a vote on the employer’s last 
offer.
At this time, the Liberal government of New Brunswick was treat­
ing its citizens to a picture of the province which depicted New Brunswick as 
“fighting above [its] weight” and being “open for business”.24 Did these mea­
sures against workers protection improve quality of life in New Brunswick?
The answer may be partially found in a publication from Industry Canada 
Research in 2000 entitled “A Regional Perspective of the Canada-U.S. Standard of 
Living Comparison,” by Raynald Letoumeau and Martine Lajoie.25 The study ex­
amined the period of 1995 to 1997 (the last two years of McKenna’s term as Pre­
mier) and focused on a comparison of standards of living with a special emphasis 
on labour productivity. The report concluded that standards of living varied less 
across provinces than among states in the United States of America. Although this 
reflects different economic profiles between provinces and states, it is also related 
to the presence of federal transfers to the province, such as the equalization pro­
gram which tended to reduce regional disparities. Among the Canadian provinces, 
New Brunswick ranked seventh, ahead of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and 
Newfoundland, which ranked lowest, about 30 percent below the national average.26
In comparison with the fifty states of the U.S., New Brunswick came in at the 
bottom, fifty-seventh out of sixty. Its three Atlantic Canadian counterparts rounded 
out the bottom to sixty.27 The study recognized that productivity rankings among the 
Canadian provinces were also very similar to those for standard of living, highlight­
ing the importance of the level of productivity as a fundamental determinant of the 
standard of living.
The Atlantic provinces’ post-productivity levels were well below the national 
average, with New Brunswick ahead of only Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. 
Among the Canadian provinces and the U.S. states, New Brunswick ranked fifty-eight 
of sixty.
If decently paid jobs are derived from a worker’s right to unionize and
23 Mann, supra note 20 at 14.
24 Ibid.
25 Industry Canada, A Regional Perspective o f the Canada-US Standard ofLiving Comparison by 
Raynald Létoumeau & Martine Lajoie (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2000).
26 Ibid. at 24, 7.
27 Ibid. at 9.
negotiate fair collective agreements, employment status that allows for reason­
able job security and work confidence, then it is reasonable to conclude that 
over the last twenty years in New Brunswick, regressive labour legislation has 
had a negative impact on both productivity and quality of life in the province.
The legislative measures to prop up a neo-liberal ideology established by 
Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney failed working people in New Brunswick. The 
deliberate re-entrenchment of boundaries, as Arthurs put it, arrived in New Bruns­
wick under the influence of neo-liberal policies developed in other jurisdictions.
The legislative assault on public sector workers’ rights in New Brunswick has 
continued into the current decade with the implementation of more restrictive labour 
legislation. In 2001, the Progressive Conservative government of Premier Bernard 
Lord enacted back-to-work legislation against a striking CUPE hospital bargaining 
unit. This back-to-work legislation prompted a rallying cry from other public sector 
unions. The New Brunswick Union of Public and Private Employees enacted a charter 
of principles relating to public sector back-to-work legislation, including that the New 
Brunswick Union:
♦ go into bargaining with the full intent of negotiating a fair 
and equitable wage increase for each year of the contract.
♦ do everything within its resources to ensure pub­
lic sector jobs remain in the public sector.
♦ reaffirm its total commitment to free collective bar­
gaining; meaning that should legislation be imposed 
on a contract or back-to-work legislation be passed, 
it will respond in the strongest possible fashion.
In September 2004, the Lord government utilized the threat of back-to- 
work legislation against five thousand hospital nurses represented by the New 
Brunswick Nurses Union.28 The parties reached a settlement before implementation.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Without legislated protection, other agendas will trump workers’ rights. Making New 
Brunswick “open for business” could cause a further reduction in benefits, working 
conditions, and indeed the full panoply of workers’ rights. The reduction in the size and 
scope of government, privatization of public services, and balancing pay roll benefits 
(workers’ compensation, etc.) all favour the employers of the province but narrow the 
boundaries of protection for New Brunswick workers. The emerging global economic 
crisis could ultimately be used to justify further reductions on workers’ protection.
28 “New Brunswick nurses accept contract deal”, CBC News, 23 September 2004, <http://www.cbc.ca/ 
canada/story/2004/09/23/nbnurses_040923.html>, accessed April 2,2009.
The boundaries of worker protection in New Brunswick have fallen prey to a 
deliberate political agenda to facilitate the paradigm shift in the economy of work. Ar­
thur’s three premises for the demise of legislative protections may, in New Brunswick, 
be simply reduced to a regulatory competition among provincial governments across 
Canada to be more open for business, exposing talented workforces to the whims of 
transient service economy employers and mirroring substandard benefits and protec­
tions for their own employees normally paid in accordance with the principles of the 
service sector.
The New Brunswick Federation of Labour has called for the Provin­
cial Government to enact anti-scab and first contract legislation, in addition to 
improving statutory protection for organizing groups of workers into unions.
If New Brunswick aspires to attract and retain a skilled workforce, it must 
improve its approach to the treatment of workers and respect basic human rights, 
most notably the right to collective bargaining. Without the redevelopment of sound 
progressive legislation, and the reestablishment of a political will to protect workers, 
the legal directives established by the coauthors of the SCC decision in B.C. Health 
Services will remain nothing more than an illusion for workers in New Brunswick.
